We initiate the study of strategic behavior in screening processes with multiple classifiers. We focus on two contrasting settings: a conjunctive setting in which an individual must satisfy all classifiers simultaneously, and a sequential setting in which an individual to succeed must satisfy classifiers one at a time. In other words, we introduce the combination of strategic classification with screening processes. We show that sequential screening pipelines exhibit new and surprising behavior where individuals can exploit the sequential ordering of the tests to zig-zag between classifiers without having to simultaneously satisfy all of them. We demonstrate an individual can obtain a positive outcome using a limited manipulation budget even when far from the intersection of the positive regions of every classifier. Finally, we consider a learner whose goal is to design a sequential screening process that is robust to such manipulations, and provide a construction for the learner that optimizes a natural objective.

This paper presents an analysis of data from a gift-exchange-game experiment. The experiment was described in `The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity' by G\"achter et al. 2012. Since this paper uses state-of-art data science techniques, the results provide a different point of view on the problem. As already shown in relevant literature from experimental economics, human decisions deviate from rational payoff maximization. The average gift rate was $31$%. Gift rate was under no conditions zero. Further, we derive some special findings and calculate their significance.